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Abstract: In the context of a socially networked economy, this paper demon-
strates an Edgeworth equivalence between the set of competitive allocations and
the core. Each participant in the economy may have multiple links with other
participants and the equilibrium network may be as large as the entire set of
participants. A clique is a group of people who are all connected with each
other. Large cliques, possibly as large as the entire population, are permitted;
this is important since we wish to include in our analysis large, world-wide or-
ganizations such as workers in multi-national …rms and members of world-wide
environmental organizations, for example, as well as small cliques, such as two-
person partnerships. A special case of our model is equivalent to a club economy
where clubs may be large and individuals may belong to multiple clubs. The
features of our model that cliques within a networked economy may be as large
as the entire population and individuals may belong to multiple cliques thus al-
low us to extend the extant decentralisation literature on competitive pricing in
economies with clubs and multiple memberships (where club sizes are uniformly
bounded, independent of the size of the economy).
1The authors are indebted to John Conley, Frank Page and Ben Zissimos for helpful com-
ments and for references to the literature..
2This paper was submitted to the Athens General Equilibrium Conference in March of this
year and is to be presented there in May 2002.
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1 Introduction
There have been few studies of competitive pricing in networked economies.
Recent literature, however, suggests that whenever all or almost all gains to
collective activities can be realized by groups of participants bounded in size,
then diverse economies resemble markets, including economies with indivisibil-
ities, nonconvexities, local public goods, club economies with multiple mem-
berships, and with networks. In particular, approximate cores are nonempty,
approximate cores treat similar people similarly and economies with many par-
ticipants, modelled as games with side payments, generate market games.3 In
this paper, we demonstrate an Edgeworth equivalence theorem for socially net-
worked economies where small groups of participants can realize all or almost
all gains to collective activities. The economies allow ever increasing returns to
network size.
It seems compelling that gains to cooperation may forever increase as the size
of an economy increases. One example, for a private goods exchange economy,
is presented in Hammond, Kaneko and Wooders (1989). There, because the
percentages of agents of each of two types are rational, as they must be in any
…nite economy, the set of equal treatment outcomes in utility space may be
forever increasing (strictly) as the economy is replicated. In economies with
public goods, coordination of activities and decreasing costs of providing public
goods may also lead to ever increasing gains to population size. Thus, a general
model of network economies (or economies with public goods) should allow both
small networks bounded in size of membership, base ball teams or marriages for
example, and also permit the possibility of ever-increasing gains to larger and
larger networks. A general model should also allow overlapping cliques so that
a participant may belong, for example, to a two-person partnership, a dance
club, and a world-wide environmental organization.
De…ne a clique as a group of individuals who are all connected to each other
and all engage in some clique activity. Cliques may overlap; that is, two dis-
tinct cliques may contain some of the same individuals. A network has the
usual interpretation. In the current paper, a network is restricted to be a clique
structure of the total population and a clique is analogous to a club, as in Ko-
valenkov and Wooders (1997), for example; for the current paper, we use the
terms clique and club interchangeably. In the literature on approximate cores
of games and economies with collective activities and clubs, there are a num-
ber of models in the literature permitting ever-increasing gains to coalition and
club sizes. See especially Wooders (1983,1994) and also Kovalenkov and Wood-
ers (1997, 2001a, 2001b). None of these models rule out games derived from
economies where individuals may belong to overlapping cliques and where there
may be ever-increasing gains to network and clique size. In addition, following
Shubik and Wooders (1982), Kovalenkov and Wooders (1997) explicitly allow
an individual to belong to overlapping cliques. There have also been a number
of papers demonstrating that states of the economy in approximate cores of
3Wooders (1994) demonstrates that games with many players and side payments are market
games as introduced in Shapley and Shubik (1969).
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economies with clubs can be supported as price-taking equilibrium outcomes.
None of these papers studying price-taking equilibrium, however, satisfy the cri-
teria that equilibrium clubs may be large – as large as the entire population, for
example – and that individuals may belong to overlapping clubs. The model of
the current paper allows both of these features. We obtain preliminary results
for replication economies with a …xed percentage of players of each of a …nite
number of types but where cliques and networks may become larger and larger
as the economy is replicated. We demonstrate conditions ensuring that feasible
equal-treatment payo¤s are bounded. This implies that, given " > 0, for all suf-
…ciently large replications, there are equal-treatment states of the economy in
approximate cores.4 We then show that such states of the economy are approxi-
mate price-taking equilibrium outcomes. We stress that while the results of this
paper are only for sequences of economies with the same percentages of agents
of each type, the techniques to broadly extend the framework and results are
all in place, primarily based on results on nonemptiness of approximate cores of
large games in Kovalenkov and Wooders (1997, 2001a, 2001b).
In the special setting of this preliminary paper, a clique is analogous to a
club and overlapping cliques are analogous to club economies allowing multi-
ple memberships. The technique introduced in this paper can be extended to
networks of signi…cant generality and with appropriate assumptions, the results
of this paper will also extend.5 Note that some of these papers allow both di-
rected networks and hierarchical (or super) networks, that is, situations where
there may be networks of networks, which we anticipate will be important in
subsequent research.
Our approach in this paper is in part based on earlier research, especially
Wooders (1983), showing that under apparently mild restrictions – boundedness
of per capita payo¤s in utility space – approximate cores of replication games are
nonempty.6 The crucial innovation in the current paper, which will allow us to
obtain signi…cantly more general results, is our construction of the commodity
space. Part of this innovation is in extending and further developing the Foley
(1970)-Wooders (1985) proof technique of de…ning ‘preferred sets of allocations
of private goods’ for coalitions. To ensure that the games derived from the
economies satisfy per capita boundedness – simply boundedness of the set of
equal treatment payo¤s – we make an assumption of ‘desirability of wealth’.
Informally, this assumption dictates that there is some level of wealth, measured
in terms of a bundle of private goods, such that an individual would prefer that
level of wealth and membership in some bounded number of cliques, all bounded
in size, to any feasible equal-treatment outcome in any economy, no matter how
4That is, identical agents are assigned consumption bundles that yield the same utility
levels (although the bundles themselves may di¤er).
5We have in mind networks as de…ned in, for example, Goyal (1993), Jackson and Wolinsky
(1996), Dutta and Mutuswami (1997), Belle‡amme and Bloch (2001), van den Nouweland and
Slikker (2001), and Page and Wooders (2001).
6Note that in Wooders (1983), the set of players is replicated but the payo¤ set to any
coalition of players may increase as the size of the total population increases. See also Wooders
(1988) for a …rst application of her 1983 results to economies with multiple private goods and
with local public goods.
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large. Loosely, desirability of wealth implies that private goods can compensate
for membership in large networks and cliques. Following conditions laid down
in Shubik and Wooders (1982) and Kovalenkov and Wooders (1997), clique
structures are required to satisfy some apparently mild properties: individuals
may subsist in cliques consisting of themselves alone; and for any two disjoint
coalitions, the union of admissible clique structures of the union of the two
coalitions is a clique structure of the coalition.
This paper points the way to broader results. In particular, in future research
we:
1. Make a distinction between the crowding types and taste types of agents
(as in Conley and Wooders 1997, 2001, for example) and show that the
outcomes of price-taking equilibrium, with clique participation prices de-
…ned to depend only on crowding types of participants, are equivalent to
the set of outcomes in the core;
2. Allow endogenous choice of crowding types, skills for example, (as in Con-
ley and Wooders 1996, 2001) and still obtain equivalence of price-taking
equilibrium outcomes and the core;
3. Relax the assumption of replication of the set of participants to allow a
compact metric space of crowding types and arbitrary player sets. (It is
here that the results of Kovalenkov and Wooders will be useful.)
4. Incorporate general network structures as in Page and Wooders (2001)
and Rockafellar (1984), and allow hierarchical networks.
(Of course the above results hold in general only for approximate cores and
approximate equilibrium outcomes since, without special assumptions, we can
only ensure nonemptiness of approximate cores.) We also plan to eventually
allow widespread externalities, as in Hammond, Kaneko and Wooders (1989)
and Kaneko and Wooders (1989). In this case, however, without further as-
sumptions, we will loose the optimality of equilibrium outcomes.
Continuing with the motivation for our paper, the importance of overlapping
cliques is perhaps clear. What may not be immediately clear is the importance
of allowing optimal or equilibrium cliques to be unbounded in size and possibly
as large as the entire economy. Consider, however, questions of global pollution,
global harmonization of productive activities and memberships in networks. If
we wish our model to describe cliques such as the World Trade Organization, the
United Nations, the World Environmental Organization, or Christian religions
which wish to embrace all people, then a model with bounded clique sizes, where
cliques become in…nitesimal as the economy grows large, is not appropriate;
clique sizes must be unbounded.
In the following, we …rst develop the formal model and state and prove the
results, except for Theorem 3, the main result, which is proven in an appendix.
After stating the results, we relate our research to the literature and then provide
some concluding remarks.
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2 The Model
2.1 Agents
We consider an economy with N = ft = 1; :::; Tg agents. For each positive
integer r the set of agents in the rth replica economy is denoted by
Nr = f(t; q) : t = 1; :::; T and q = 1; :::; rg;
and (t; q) is called the qth agent of type t. It will be the case that all agents of
the same type are identical in terms of their consumption sets, endowments and
preferences.
Given Nr and t 2 f1; :::; Tg, let [t]r denote the set of agents of type t in the
rth replica economy. We call every nonempty subset S of Nr a clique. Let s be
a vector in NT with tth component given by
st = jS \ [t]r j:
The vector s, called the pro…le of S, lists the numbers of agents of each type in
S.
The economy has L private goods. A vector of private goods is denoted by
x = (x1; :::; x`; :::; xL) 2 RL+.
For given a nonempty subset S of Nr , we call any collection of subsets of
S that covers S, denoted by S; a clique structure of S. A clique structure of
Nr is called simply a network. (We re-iterate that this special form of network
is adopted here but our techniques will signi…cantly extend, to allow directed
and hierarchical networks). There is only one clique good, a public good for
the membership of the clique, available to each clique S. The production of the
clique good requires zS 2 ¡RL+ inputs of private goods.
Given a clique structure S = fS1; : : : ; Sk; : : : ; SKg of S ½ Nr and tq 2 S,
let S[tq] = fSk 2 S j tq 2 Skg denote the set of all cliques in S that contain
consumer tq. That is, the set S[tq] denotes the clique goods consumption of
agent t with respect to S. The set I [t] = [fS;qgS[tq] is called the network
consumption set for agents tq. Let ftqg denote the clique consisting of consumer
tq only.
It is assumed that each agent has a positive endowment of each private good
and that there are no endowments of clique goods. Let wtq be the endowment
of the tqth agent of the private goods, wtq 2 RL++. It is assumed that all agents
of the same type have the same endowments, that is
wtq = wtq
0
; 8q; q0 2 f1; : : : ; rg:
The utility function of the tqth agent is denoted by utq(¢; ¢) and maps Xt£I[t]
into R, where Xt, called the commodities consumption set for agents tq, is a
subset of RL. We assume that wtq is in the interior of Xt. The utility functions
of all agents of type t are identical, let ut(¢; ¢) denote the utility function of an
arbitrary agent of type t.
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It is assumed that for each S[tq] in I [t] the utility function satis…es the usual
properties of monotonicity, continuity and convexity. Speci…cally, for any given
network goods consumption S[tq] in I [t], the utility function ut satis…es:
(a) Monotonicity: ut(¢;S [tq]) is an increasing function, that is, if x < x0
then ut(x; S[tq]) < ut(x0; S[tq]) .
(b) Continuity: ut(¢; S[tq]) is a continuous function:
(c) Convexity: ut(¢;S [tq]) is a quasi-concave function.
(d) Desirability of endowment: if ut(wtq ; ftqg) · ut(x0; S[tq])g then
x0 >> 0:
With the exception of (d), the conditions above are all standard. Condition
(d) incorporates the Hammond-Kaneko-Wooders (1989) and Kaneko-Wooders
(1989) condition that the endowment is preferred to any outcome which assigns
an agent zero of any of the indivisible (clique) goods. Some such assumption
is needed to ensure that for large economies, states of the economy in the core
have the equal treatment property.7
2.2 States of the Economy
Let S be a nonempty subset of Nr and let S be a network for S. A state of the
economy for S relative to S is an ordered pair (xS ; S), where xS is an allocation
for S. The state (xS ;S) is feasible if
X
tq2S
(xtq ¡ wtq) · X
S2S
zS :
The following concept of the core can be interpreted as either a notion of an
approximate core or as an exact core subject to communication. If a group of
agents is to form an alliance – a coalition – then they must communicate with
each other and possibly reallocate goods among the members of the coalition.
Such communication is costly. This a¤ects the net resources available to any
coalition after it has formed. We suppose that there is a communication cost in
order to form any coalition. Let ¹z 2 ¡RL++ and " > 0, we denote by c("; S) =
"jSj¹z the communication cost for coalition S. Moreover, we assume that agents
share the communication cost equally. The state (xS ;S) is c(")-feasible if
X
tq2S
(xtq ¡ wtq) · X
S2S
zS + "jSj¹z:
7 In the literature of private goods exchange economies, related, more restrictive conditions
go back to Broome (1973). For economies with local public goods/clubs an analogous condition
was introduced in Wooders (1978,1980). The Hammond-Kaneko-Wooders (1989) condition is
less restrictive.
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2.3 The c(")-Core
Let (xNr ; Nr) be a state of the economy relative to the network Nr. A coalition
S can c(")¡improve upon the state (xNr ; Nr) if there is a network S of S and a
c(")-feasible state of the economy (x0S ;S) for S such that for all consumers
t 2 S it holds that:
ut(x0tq ;S[tq]) > ut(xtq; Nr[tq]):
A state of the economy (xNr ;Nr) is in the c(")-core (of the economy) if it
cannot be c(")-improved upon by any coalition S.8 It is clear that when " = 0,
the c(")-core coincides with the usual core.
2.4 The "-equilibrium
In this section we de…ne an "-equilibrium and demonstrate that an "-equilibrium
state of the economy is in the c(")-core. Our notion of "¡equilibrium allows at
least some agents to spend more than their income at the given prices.
A price system for private goods is a vector p 2 RL+. A participation price
system is a set
¦ = f¼tq(S) 2 R : S ½ Nr and tq 2 Sg;
stating a participation price, positive, negative, or zero, for each agent in each
clique. An "-equilibrium (for an economy with clique goods) is an ordered
triple ((xNr ;Nr); p; ¦) consisting of a state of the economy (xNr ; Nr), where
Nr = fJ1; :::; Jg; :::; JGg; a price system p 2 RL+ n f0g for private goods, and a
participation price system ¦, such that:
(i)
P
tq2Nr (x
tq ¡ wtq) · P
S2Nr
zS ;
(ii) for each clique S ½ Nr,
p ¢ zS +
X
tq2S
¼tq(S) · 0
(iii) for any agent tq 2 Nr and any network S of S ½ Nr such that tq 2 S,
if
ut(x0tq ;S[tq]) > ut(xtq;Nr [tq])
then
p ¢ x0tq + X
S2S[tq]
¼tq(S) > p ¢ wtq + "p ¢ ¹z:
8A similar notion of the core with some costs of communication was introduced in Wooders
(1988).
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(iv)
X
g
p ¢ zJg +
X
g
X
tq2Jg
¼tq(Jg) ¸
X
tq2Nr
"p ¢ ¹z; and
X
tq2Nr
p ¢ xtq + X
tq2Nr
X
g
¼tq(Jg) ·
X
tq2Nr
p ¢ wtq + "p ¢ ¹z:
Intuitively, our notion of an approximate equilibrium involves bounded ra-
tionality. We suppose that there is a small cost of changing ones consumption
bundle so that individuals may be slightly in the interior of their budgets sets.
Theorem 1: An "-equilibrium state of the economy is in the c(")-core.
Proof : Suppose the Theorem is false. Then there is an "-equilibrium ((xNr ;Nr); p; ¦)
with the property that the state of the economy (xNr ;Nr) is not in the c(")-core
of the economy. This means that there is a coalition S ½ Nr, a network S of S
and an allocation (x0S ; S) such that
X
tq2S
(x0tq ¡ wtq) · X
S2S
zS + "jSj¹z
and
ut(x0tq ;S[tq]) > ut(xtq; Nr[tq]):
From (ii) of the de…nition of an "-equilibrium it follows that
p ¢ zS +
X
tq2S
¼tq(S) · 0
and from utility maximization, it holds that
p ¢ x0tq + X
S2S[tq]
¼tq(S) > p ¢ wtq + "p ¢ ¹z:
Summing up these above inequalities, one will haveX
tq2S
p ¢ (x0tq ¡ wtq) > X
S2S
p ¢ zS + p ¢ "jSj¹z;
which is a contradiction.
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3 Convergence of the Core to Equilibrium States
of the Economy
Before stating our convergence theorem, we de…ne replications of a state of
the economy. To replicate a state of the economy, in addition to replicating
the consumer set we also replicate the network and consumptions so that all
replicas of an individual consumer are in cliques with identical pro…les, and are
allocated identical consumptions.
For given r0; let Nr0 = fJ1; :::; Jg ; :::; JGg be a network of Nr0 and let r = nr0,
where n is a positive integer. Let Nr be a network of Nr containing nG cliques
and denoted by:
Nr = fJgj : j = 1; :::; n and g = 1; :::;Gg;
where for each j = 1; :::; n and each g = 1; :::;G the pro…le of Jgj equals the
pro…le of Jg. Then Nr is the nth replication of Nr0 :
Let (xNr0 ; Nr0) be a state of the economy. Given a positive integer n, let
Nnr0 be the nth replication of Nr0 . A state of the economy (xNr ; Nr) is an nth
replication of (xNr0 ; Nr0) if
(a) for each g = 1; :::;G and each n = 1; :::; r,
zgj = zg;
(b) for each consumer tq there are n consumers tq0 in the replication having
the same allocation as tq.
A state of the economy (xNr0 ;Nr0) is in the c(")-core for all replications if,
for each positive integer n, it holds that an nth replication of (xNr0 ; Nr0) is in
the c(")-core of the nth replication of the economy.
4 The Game Derived from an Economy and Per
Capita Boundedness
First, let us select "0 such that wtq + "0¹z 2 Xt and if ut(wtq + "0¹z; ftqg) ·
ut(x0; S[tq])g then x0 >> 0: By continuity with respect to the private good such
an "0 exists.
Given r and " 2 [0; "0] we associate a correspondence V "r with the rth econ-
omy where V "r maps subsets S of Nr into RNr . For each subset S of Nr, de…ne
V "r as the set of vectors ® 2 RNr with the property that for some networkS of S and some c(")-feasible state with associated allocation (xS ;S) we have
®tq · ut(xtq ;S[tq]) for each tq 2 S. When " = 0, we denote V "r simply by Vr.
It is straightforward to verify the sequences of derived games (Nr ; V "r )1r=1 is a
sequence of superadditive replica. Moreover the games are comprehensive.
The set of equal treatment payo¤s of (Nr ; V "r )1r=1 is given by
E(r; ") = f® 2 RN j ¦ri=1® 2 V "(Nr)g:
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We require some minimal assumption on the economy to ensure that equal-
treatment utilities derived from the economy do not become in…nite. To this
purpose we introduce the following assumption:
Desirability of wealth : Assume that there is a bundle of private goods, x¤ and
a replication number r¤, such that for any other bundle of private goods
x; for some network of the r¤th economy, it holds that, for any r, for any
t,
ut(xt + x¤;Nr¤ [t]) ¸ ut(xt; Nr[t])
for any network Nr of the rth economy.
Informally, this assumption ensures that wealth, in terms of private goods, can
substitute for large clique memberships, no matter how large the economy. Be-
cause of the possibility of ever-increasing returns to clique size, due to public
goods for example, in our model agents may derive more and more utility from
larger and larger cliques. Desirability of wealth ensures that if an individual
were su¢ciently wealthy, however, he could provide clique goods for himself
and his friends. Note that x¤ is independent of the type of the player; this is
for simplicity of statement.
Theorem 1. Assume desirability of wealth. Then there is a positive real
number K such that for any replication number r and for any utility equal
treatment feasible state of the rth economy,
suput(x; Nr[t]) < K:
Proof : To show per-capita boundedness of (Nr; V "r )1r=1 we construct a sequence
of *-economies and consider the sequence of games, denoted by (Nr; V ¤r )1r=1,
derived from the sequences of *-economies. We construct the sequence of *-
economies so that V "r (Nr) ½ V ¤r (Nr) and show that (Nr; V ¤r )1r=1 satis…es per-
capita boundedness to obtain the conclusion of the theorem.
For each rth *-economy, let the utility function of agent tq be de…ned by
u¤t(xtq) = max ut(xtq + x¤;Nr¤ [t]);
where r¤ satis…es desirability of wealth.
The utility functions u¤t are well de…ned and are quasi-concave. Also. it is
clear that given any (xtq;Nr[tq]) we have
u¤t(xtq) ¸ utq(xtq ;Nr [tq]):
For each r, the allocation (xNr), is *-feasible if
X
tq2Nr
(xtq ¡ wtq) · 0:
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The set of all *-feasible allocations is denoted by A¤r . Let K be a real number
such that
K > supxt2A¤1u
¤t(xt):
From the closeness of A¤1 and quasi concavity there is a such real number.
Obviously, K is a per-capita bound :¤
Desirability of wealth thus implies that the sequence of economies satis…es
per capita boundedness and, given any " 2 [0; "0], the c(")-core of the game
derived from the economy, is non-empty for a subsequence of economies, that
is, given any r there is an integer m0 such that for all integers `, the `m0rth
economy has a nonempty c(")-core. However, from desirability of endowments,
monotonicity, and divisibility of private commodities, we also have the following
result.
Theorem 2: Assume desirability of wealth. Then, given " > 0 there is a
replication number r(") such that for all r > r("), the c(")-core of the game
derived from the rth economy is nonempty.
Proof : This follows from Wooders (1983) and Wooders (1988) Theorem 2.
Theorem 3: if (xNr ;Nr) is in the c(")-core of the economy for all replications
of the economy, then (xNr ; Nr) is an "-equilibrium state of the economy.
We postpone the proof of Theorem 3 to an Appendix.
5 Relationships to the literature
In his seminal paper, Tiebout (1956) suggests that, if public goods are subject
to congestion, the bene…ts of sharing costs over a large number of agents will
eventually be o¤set by the negative e¤ects of crowding. When it is optimal
to have many jurisdictions providing such public goods, Tiebout conjectures
that the movement of consumers to their preferred jurisdictions will lead to a
‘market-type,’ near-optimal outcome and the free rider problem of economies
with pure public goods will not arise, the ‘Tiebout Hypothesis.’ Early contri-
butions to this literature include Pauly (1972), treating an economy consisting
of identical agents and Wooders (1978,1980), who allows several types of agents
and nondi¤erentiated (or anonymous) crowding.9 A short survey of the vast
literature is provided in Wooders (1999). In Conley and Wooders (1996,1997),
and Cole and Prescott (1997) the model is further developed in that the crowd-
ing types of agents (external characteristics) are separated from taste types and
9The agents appear to di¤er but, as shown in Wooders (1976), the fact that both types of
agents make the identical marginal contributions to coalitions implies that only the size and
not the composition of coalitions is relevant.
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it is shown that …rst best prices can be de…ned to depend only on the crowding
types of agents; no private information is required.10
In the economic models of those papers listed above agents are allowed to
belong to only one jurisdiction. Allowing multiple memberships in clubs, Shu-
bik and Wooders (1982) demonstrated nonemptiness of approximate cores of
economies with many agents but price-taking equilibrium was not studied. Ko-
valenkov and Wooders (1997) demonstrated conditions under which large …nite
games and economies with clubs and permitting multiple memberships have
nonempty approximate cores. Subsequently, Ellickson et al (2001) introduced
a model of an economy with multiple memberships and obtained approximate
versions of existence of equilibrium and equivalence of the core and the set of
equilibrium outcomes. Their model is more restrictive than the prior model of
Kovalenkov and Wooders, since there are only a …nite number of distinct sorts
of clubs, so clubs become negligible as the economy grows large. As Conley and
Wooders (1997) and Cole and Prescott (1997), Ellickson et al. make a distinc-
tion between the crowding types (in their language, ‘external characteristics’)
of agents and their taste (and endowment) types.
While Ellickson et al. extend the prior equivalence results for economies
with local public goods/cliques in several aspects, there is one important aspect
where there model is more restrictive than the prior literature. In particular,
they model the economy as one with a …nite number of sorts of clubs, which
enables them to treat the economy similarly to an economy with a …nite number
of indivisible commodities. The major di¤erence of the economy from one with
private goods appears to be in the feasibility condition on club memberships.
Unfortunately, this rules out situations where there are ever-increasing returns
to club size, which are permitted in Wooders (1989,1993) and in Shubik and
Wooders (1982), and of course the Kovalenkov-Wooders papers.
In view of the prior literature on large games and large economies one might
hope for approximate equivalence in large …nite economies even with multiple
memberships in cliques and with potentially ever-increasing returns to clique
size. The crucial restriction appears to be that all or almost all gains to collective
activities are realized by groups bounded in size; that is, that small groups are
e¤ective. In the case of one-private-good, the restrictions of Ellickson et al.
transform the economy into one satisfying strict small group e¤ectiveness, that
is, all gains to collective activities can be realized by groups of players bounded
in absolute size.
In this paper, we have taken a …rst step towards obtaining equivalence of the
core and price-taking equilibrium outcomes when club sizes may be unbounded.
We start with a replica economy situation. More speci…cally, we show that if a
10When crowding is anonymous – that is, individuals care only about the numbers of agents
in the same jurisdiction and not their characteristics – then prices are anonymous (Wooders
1978). With di¤erentiated (also known as nonanonymous) crowding, until the works of Conley
and Wooders (1996,1997) and Cole and Prescott (1997), prices were also nonanonymous, de-
pending on tastes. Conley and Wooders (1996,1997) and Cole and Prescott (1997) separated
taste types from crowding types and showed that …rst best prices can be de…ned to depend
only on crowding types or external characteristics of agents.
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state of the economy is in the core for all replications of that economy, then it
is an equilibrium state of the economy. We also show that an equilibrium state
is in the core.
The results in the current version of this paper are preliminary and conclude
with the replication model. Approximate cores are supported by approximate
equilibria. To relax the replication restriction, it is only necessary to ensure
that small group e¤ectiveness is satis…ed. Here we can exploit the results of
Kovalenkov and Wooders (1997, 2000, 2001). In brief, once it is known that
approximate cores are nonempty, based on the techniques in this preliminary
version of our research, it can be shown that approximate equilibria exist and
are in approximate cores. In addition, we show that approximate cores converge
to equilibrium outcomes.
For the reader familiar with the previous literature on large games and
economies with clubs/local public goods, it is apparent that one can build sub-
stantially on our results for replica games/economies. Thus, we spend some
time describing our approach, which itself builds on the research of Debreu and
Scarf (1963), Foley (1970) and Wooders (1989). Recall that, given a state of the
economy that is in the core for all replications of the total agent set, Debreu and
Scarf (1963) de…ne the set of preferred net trades of each agent in the economy
and show that the convex hull of union of these sets can be separated from
the origin. For an economy with pure public goods, Foley (1970) extends the
commodity space to make the public good a separate good for each consumer.
Wooders (1989) further extends the commodity space to make local public goods
for each consumer in each possible jurisdiction separate commodities. In this
paper, we build on these three approaches. Precisely, we extend the public good
space so that each clique and its membership is a di¤erent commodity for each
agent in the clique. Thus, in this respect, the techniques of Debreu and Scarf
(1963) apply. We also introduce a virtual production set. Even though we have
no production in the current paper, our virtual production set plays a similar
role to the extended production sets in Foley (1970) and Wooders (1989). In
particular, the feasibility requirements ensuring the clique choices are consistent
are imposed on the virtual production set.
From the point of view of the literature on large economies with private
goods only, a paper that is relevant to our longer range objectives is Kirman,
Oddou and Weber (1986). The purpose of the (stochastic) networks in that
paper is to facilitate trade in private commodities. We conjecture that similar
results of convergence of cores may be obtainable in models of socially networked
economies, with large networks, as long as some condition of boundedness of per
capita payo¤s or e¤ectiveness of small groups (that is, all or almost all gains to
collective activities can be realized by groups bounded in size of membership).
6 Conclusions
With the fundamental results of this paper it is possible to extend the results
to hold in all respects in the same or more generality as the extant literature.
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The major economic importance of our research is that equilibrium cliques and
networks may be unbounded – they do not necessarily become in…nitesimal as
the economy grows large. This aspect of our modelling is especially relevant for
questions of political economy, for example, and to issues of regulation of large
…rms, such as multinationals. We hope to study these issues, as well as other
issues relating to labor markets in economies with large …rms/jurisdictions in
future research.
7 Appendix: Proof of Theorem 3
The proof of the Theorem is an adaptation of proofs of convergence of the
core to equilibrium states due to Debreu and Scarf (1963) and existence proof
of Foley (1970) and Wooders (1989). Without any loss of generality we can
assume N = Nr. Let fS1; :::; Sk; :::; SKg denote the set of all cliques in N . Let
(~xN ;N ) be a state of the economy, with N = fJ1; :::; Jg; :::; JGg. Assume that
(~xN ;N ) is in the c(")-core for all replications of the economy.
Preliminaries: We …rst consider the following space A = RTK where T is the
number of agents and K is the number of cliques. Let a = (a1; :::; at; :::; aT ) be
a vector where, for each t, at = (at1; :::; atk; :::; a
t
K) and for each k, atk 2 R. Let
At be the set of elements in RK de…ned by
At = fa 2 RTK : at0k = 0 if t 6= t0or if t =2 Skg:
For a given S [t] 2 I[t], we represent S[t] in At by a, such that atk equal one
if Sk belongs to S[t] and equal zero otherwise.
We next de…ne a ‘virtual’ production set in the extended commodity space.
For each k de…ne b[k] 2 RTK as a vector having the properties that:
(i) b[k]tk0 = 0 if k 6= k0 or if t =2 Sk
(ii) for (any) t in Sk, b[k]tk = 1
De…ne the virtual production set Y as the convex cone generated by the
f(zSk ; b[k]) : k = 1; : : : ;Kg, where zSk is the input required to form the
clique zSk . The set Y is precisely the set of all positive linear combinations
of f(zSk ; b[k]) : k = 1; : : : ; Kg.
Step 1: The sets of preferred allocations -t. Let -t denote the set of
members of (xt ¡ wt ¡ "¹z; at) in Xt £ At such that, for every network S with
the property that S [t] = fSk j atk = 1g, we have ut(xt;S[t]) > ut(~xt;N [t]):
The set -t ½ RL+TK describes the set of net trades of private goods and
clique memberships for agent t strictly preferred to his allocation in the given
state of the economy (~xN ;N ): It is clear that -t is not convex.
Step 2: The preferred set -. Let - denote the convex hull of the union of
the sets -t, t = 1; :::; T . We now show, in the remainder of Step 2, that
- \ Y = ;:
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Suppose, on the contrary, that (x; a) 2 - \ Y . Then, by the de…nition of
- there exist an integer J and ¸ 2 RJ such that (x; a) = PJj=1 ¸j(xj; aj) with
¸j > 0,
P
¸j = 1.
From the de…nition of Y there exist a K 0 2 f1; : : : ; Kg and ¹ 2 RK0++ such
that
(x; a) =
X
k2K0
¹k(zSk ; b[k]):
Let us consider J [t] = fj j (xj ; aj) 2 -tg. Then, it follows from
JX
j=1
¸j(xj; aj) =
X
k2K0
¹k(zSk ; b[k])
that for each k 2 K0 and each t 2 Sk we haveX
j2J[t]
¸jaj;tk = ¹k
For a given (xj ; aj) in -t and a given sequence f(¯n)gn of real numbers.
Suppose that ¯n ¸ 1 for each n and that (¯nxj; aj) converges to one as n goes
to in…nity. Then, because of the continuity of preferences, for all n su¢ciently
large, we have (¯nxj ; aj) is in -t.
We now show that, since we have supposed that - \ Y 6= ;, we can form
a blocking coalition for some su¢ciently large replication. We will use the
following lemma.
Lemma. There exists a sequence of rational numbers (¸n1 ; : : : ; ¸
n
j ; : : : ; ¸
n
J)
converging to (¸1; : : : ; ¸j; : : : ; ¸J) having the properties that:
(i) ¸nj · ¸j
(ii) for (any) k, and for any t; t0 2 Sk we have:
X
j2J[t]
¸nj a
j;t
k =
X
j2J[t0]
¸nj a
j;t0
k :
Proof. Let us consider the closed line segment [0RJ ; ¸] in RJ . From convexity
it follows that, for any ® 2 [0RJ ; ¸], for (any) k and for any t; t0 2 Sk we have
X
j2J[t]
®jaj;tk =
X
j2J[t0]
®jaj;t
0
k :
But we know that QJ ; where Q is the set of rational number, is dense in RJ .
Hence, QJ \ [0RJ ; ¸] is dense in [0RJ ; ¸] and therefore we can choose a sequence
satisfying (i) and (ii):¤
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Let us consider the sequence (¸n1 ; : : : ; ¸
n
j ; : : : ; ¸
n
J ) de…ned above, and let us
select a positive integer n, which will eventually tend to in…nity. For each j
de…ne xjn = ¸j¸nj x
j . From the concluding paragraph of the last Step, for all n
su¢ciently large (xjn; aj) 2 -t. Let n satisfy the property that (xjn; aj) 2 -t
for each t. Recall that ¸nj is a rational number.
Now, let us de…ne ¹nk =
P
j2J [t] ¸
n
j aj;t
0
n : Since
PJ
j=1 ¸
n
j xjn =
P
k2K0 ¹kzk;
¹nk · ¹k and zk 2 ¡RL+, it follows that
JX
j=1
¸nj x
jn · X
k2K0
¹nkzk
Let r0 be a replication number such that r0¸nj is an integer for all j. Let
±j = r0¸nj and °k =
P
j2J[t] ±j: It holds that
JX
j=1
±jxjn ¸
X
k2K0
°kzk:
Recall that 1 is the pro…le of N so r1 is the pro…le of Nr . Let r¤ be su¢ciently
large so that
P
k °ksk · r¤1. From our choice of r¤ it holds that Nr¤ contains
a subset, say S with pro…le s, such that s =
P
k2K0 °ksk. This implies that
there is a state of the economy for the group S that can c(")-improve upon the
initially given state of the economy. The state of the economy for S described
by the consumption plans (xjn; aj), for ±j consumers, for each j is c(")-feasible
and preferred by all members of the replication of the initially given state of
the economy. Consequently, S can c(")- improve upon the r¤th replication of
(~xN ;N ), which is a contradiction. Therefore - \ Y = ;.
Step 3: Prices. From the Minkowski Separating Hyperplane Theorem, there
is a hyperplane with normal (p; ¼) 6= 0, where p is in the private goods price
space, and ¼ 2 RTK such that, for some constant C,
p ¢ x + ¼ ¢ a ¸ C for all (x; a) 2 - and
p ¢ z + ¼ ¢ b · C for all (z; b) 2 Y:
Since Y is a closed convex cone with vertex zero, it follows that we can choose
C = 0. Then, in particular, it follows that for each (xt; at) 2 -t
p ¢ (xt ¡ wt ¡ "¹z) + X
fkjatk=1g
¼t(S) ¸ 0;
and for each clique S ½ N we have
p ¢ zS +
X
t2S
¼t(S) · 0:
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Recall that (~xN ;N ) is a c(")-core state of the economy relative to the network
N = fJ1; :::; JGg of N . Observe that we can represent the total consumption of
each agent t by (~xt; ~at) 2 RL+T K :
From monotonicity it follows that p ¸ 0. Suppose that p = 0. Therefore,
from the separating hyperplane it follows that for each Sk we haveX
t2Sk
¼t(Sk) · 0;
and for each t 2 Sk we have ¼t(Sk) ¸ 0. Thus ¼t(Sk) = 0, for each Sk and each
t 2 Sk, which is a contradiction to the fact that (p; ¼) 6= 0.
Since, for each t, (~xt ¡ wt ¡ "¹z; ~at) is in the closure of -t, it holds that
p ¢ (~xt ¡ wt ¡ "¹z) + X
fkj~atk=1g
¼t(S) ¸ 0:
Moreover, for each clique Jg we have
p ¢ zJg +
X
ft2Jgg
¼t(Jg) · 0:
Summing the above inequalities over consumers one obtains
p ¢ X
t2N
(~xt ¡ wt ¡ "¹z) ¸ p ¢ X
g
zJg ;
and summing over clubs one obtainsX
g
p ¢ zJg +
X
g
X
ft2Jgg
¼t(Jg) · 0:
Since p 2 RL+ n f0g and
P
t2N (~xt ¡ wt) ·
P
g zJg it follows that
Then from the fact that p ¢ zJg + Pft2Jgg ¼t(Jg) · 0 it follows thatX
t2N
p ¢ xt + X
t2N
X
S2N [t]
¼t(S) +
X
t2N
"p ¢ ¹z · X
t2N
p ¢ wt;
and X
g
p ¢ zJg +
X
g
X
ft2Jgg
¼t(Jg) ¸
X
t2N
p ¢ wt:
Now we claim that ((~xN ; N ); p; ¦) is an "-equilibrium. Checking the proof
so far, it remains only to show that individual consumers are optimizing, i.e.,
that the prices p, ¦ and the state (xN ; N ) satisfy condition (iii) of the de…nition
of an equilibrium.
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Suppose that for some consumer t, and some consumption (xt; at),
ut(xt; at) > ut(~xt; ~at) and
p ¢ (xt ¡ wt ¡ "¹z) + X
t2S
¼t(S) · 0:
From our desirablity of wealth assumption, there is a consumption x0 2 Xt such
that
p ¢ (x0 ¡ wt ¡ "¹z) + X
t2S
¼t(S) < 0:
It follows that for some x0t in the segment [x0; xt]
ut(x0t; at) > ut(~xt; ~at)
and
p ¢ (x0t ¡ wt + "¹z) + X
t2S
¼t(S) < 0;
which is a contradiction.
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